NEW JERSEY STATE LEGISLATURE

ASSEMBLY TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE CRIME

Report and Recommendations
November 22, 1994

Assemblywoman Joanna Gregory-Scocchi
Chair
Assemblyman John C. Gibson
Assemblywoman Nia H. Gill
Assemblywoman Virginia Haines
Assemblyman Lee A. Solomon
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William Savati
Task Force Aide
Office of Legislative Services
November 22, 1994

Honorable Garabed “Chuck” Haytsian, Speaker
General Assembly of New Jersey

Dear Mr. Speaker:

The Assembly Task Force on Juvenile Crime herewith respectfully submits its report and recommendations pursuant to Assembly Resolution No. 1.

[Signature]
Joanna Gregory-Scoocch
Chair
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B: New Jersey Statutes: Authorized Dispositions for Juveniles

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E-1, E-2: New Jersey expenditures: Juvenile correctional facilities and community programs

**Programs and Studies Recommended by the Task Force:**

F: Juvenile Delinquency Commission: "Restructuring Services for Delinquent Youth"

G: Juvenile Delinquency Commission: "The Future of New Jersey's Juvenile Justice System"

H: "The Regimented Juvenile Training Program" (Colorado)

I: National Conference of State Legislatures: "Juvenile Justice Reform: State Experiences"
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Assembly Task Force on Juvenile Crime was created in March, 1994 with a mandate to study the juvenile crime problem in New Jersey and to report back to the Assembly with recommendations.

Members of the public, including law enforcement personnel, social service workers, community leaders, educators and private individuals, gave testimony and offered proposals for reform during four public hearings held in various locations in the State from March through June of 1994.

After considering the testimony and studying the issue, the Task Force recommends the following:

- Make better use of our existing juvenile justice resources. A single government entity must take responsibility and be answerable to the public, the Governor, and the Legislature.

- Help communities develop innovative, community-based programs for first offenders and youth at risk. While the ultimate administrative responsibility must be in Trenton, local access and accountability are crucial.
• Support the family courts, which must be recognized as the most important in the court system. Only the family courts have the potential to prevent youthful offenders from becoming adult criminals. The family courts must be given adequate tools to do their work: there must be enough programs and services available so that each youth is placed in the setting where he—and society—can most benefit.
ASSEMBLY TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE CRIME

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Assembly Resolution No. 49, sponsored by Assemblyman Frank Catania and Assemblywoman Rose Heck, created a seven-member task force to study and make recommendations concerning the issue of juvenile crime in New Jersey. The resolution, which passed the Assembly by voice vote on March 10, 1994, authorized the Task Force on Juvenile Crime to meet and hold hearings, and to report its findings and recommendations to the Assembly, including any recommendations for legislation, within three months. The life of the Task Force was extended an additional three months by Assembly Resolution No. 81.

The Task Force held four public hearings:

- March 22, 1994, Monmouth County Library, Manalapan.
- April 12, 1994, Passaic County Community College, Paterson.
- May 4, 1994, Vineland City Hall, Vineland.
- June 22, 1994, Middlesex County College, Edison.

The Task Force heard testimony from a number of witnesses at the hearings. Witnesses included State, county and municipal law enforcement personnel; county and municipal officials; legislators; representatives of social service agencies; school administrators, and private individuals.

The members of the Task Force would like to express their appreciation to all of the witnesses who testified, whether in their official capacities or simply as concerned members of the public. The testimony was invaluable in providing insight into the complex and difficult issue of juvenile crime.
offenders, which he completed. There was no follow-up counseling or monitoring. Because the court records had been sealed, in accordance with routine procedure in juvenile matters, his neighbors never knew of the previous convictions. Shortly before the murder, Aquino was found in the girls' bathroom of a local elementary school and was charged with trespassing, a disorderly persons offense handled in municipal court.

The same month Amanda Wengert was murdered, three teenagers were charged in Vineland with what city officials called "the grisliest murder in decades." The youths broke into the home of 63-year-old George and Margaret McLoughlin to steal cash. When Mrs. McLoughlin discovered them, they shot her repeatedly. As soon as her husband walked in the front door, they shot him, kicked him and stabbed him some 20 times. The teenagers all had extensive juvenile records for burglary, assault, robbery and other crimes. The McLoughlin robbery netted them $27 in cash.

In New Jersey, the breakdown of the family, the deterioration of traditional social supports, and the increased numbers of troubled youth have resulted in soaring case loads within our juvenile justice system.

As it is currently structured, New Jersey's juvenile justice system does not have the resources to combat this surge of juvenile crime, particularly the rise of juvenile violence. Testimony received by the task force suggested that New Jersey's juvenile justice system is not a system at all, but rather a series of fragmented services operated by various agencies without proper case or planning level coordination. For example, judges must haggle, barter and persuade State level agencies to provide proper placement for delinquent youth. While the judge negotiates, youth languish in detention centers that already exceed their maximum capacity.
RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are based on testimony received by the Assembly Task Force on Juvenile Crime throughout the State as well as principles which have emerged from juvenile justice reform efforts nationwide.

1) STREAMLINE GOVERNMENT: ESTABLISH A SINGLE AUTHORITY FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE SERVICES.

Currently, New Jersey's fragmented system of juvenile justice assures that no single entity has responsibility or authority. The Department of Corrections runs the two State reformatories, at Bordentown and Jamesburg; the Department of Human Services runs residential programs and day programs; the counties fund local programs, assisted by county Youth Services Commissions.

The Task Force strongly urges that authority for all of these be consolidated under one entity, within the Department of Human Services. An Office of Youth Services within the Department would be responsible for New Jersey's juvenile justice system and answerable to the public, the Governor and the Legislature.
check-offs. In addition, the New Jersey Department of Corrections has stated that some $4 million in Federal funds may be available through the Social Security and Medicaid programs if group homes and other programs adapt to certain Federal requirements.

4) SUPPORT INNOVATIVE COMMUNITY PROGRAMS.

The former Juvenile Delinquency Commission noted in a January, 1992 newsletter that the "locus of delinquency prevention, control and treatment must be at the local level," in accordance with the principal goal of the 1983 enactment of the Juvenile Code. One goal of the Code is to expand community options for handling delinquent youths by increasing local responsibility. Yet these potentials have not been achieved, for the most part. Local programs that use innovative methods of treating and rehabilitating juveniles -- such as Paterson's "Total Lifestyle and Support Program" -- should be held up as role models across the State. The State oversight and authority in the new Office of Youth Services can help assure that successful programs be quickly duplicated in other communities.

Juveniles must receive a whole continuum of alternatives, ranging from intervention programs to at-risk youth, to community service and structured day programs for offenders and, when necessary, intensive supervision and confinement.
7) INVESTIGATE THE "WAIVER" PROCESS.

The Task Force questions whether juveniles who commit brutal crimes should be encompassed in the juvenile justice system at all. An inquiry should be made on whether the "waiver" process, which allows a juvenile to be tried as an adult (upon request of the prosecutor and the consent of the family court), is being used appropriately, and whether waiver is a viable alternative to juvenile proceedings.

8) ENACT APPROPRIATE LEGISLATION TO IMPLEMENT THESE GOALS.

Over 50 bills are currently pending in the Legislature concerning juvenile justice. While the Task Force recognizes that all of the pending bills are worthy of consideration, we specifically endorse several initiatives, and a recent enactment, that embody our recommendations. They are:

- A-23. Raises the maximum terms of incarceration which may be imposed on juveniles adjudicated delinquent for serious offenses. Currently, the maximum term of incarceration which may be imposed on a juvenile adjudicated delinquent for a crime other than murder is four years. This bill would raise the maximum term for first degree crimes to 10 years, while leaving the imposition of a maximum term to the discretion of the family court judge.
CONCLUSION

New Jersey has the opportunity to create a new and innovative system of juvenile justice. Taking advantage of this opportunity will require consolidating the responsibility for services and reallocating our resources in the most effective and efficient ways possible.
APPENDIX I

WITNESSES' TESTIMONY
PUBLIC HEARINGS

MONMOUTH COUNTY LIBRARY
MANALAPAN, NEW JERSEY

MARCH 22, 1994

1. Ted Narozanick, Member Monmouth County Board of Chosen Freeholders
2. Assemblywoman Rose M. Heck, District 38
3. John Kaye, Monmouth County Prosecutor
5. James O'Brien, Chairman, New Jersey Coalition of Crime Victims
6. Carolyn Meuly, Assistant Prosecutor, Middlesex County
7. Ben Rosenberg, Mayor, Manalapan
8. Joseph Dias
9. Fran J. Handley, Secretary to Freeholder, Monmouth County Freeholder’s Office
10. Roy Patterson, Safe Streets, Incorporated, Washington, DC and resident Manalapan Township
11. Nick Saviano
12. Henry Swordsmen, New Jersey Association Forensic Scientists
13. Paul Schliflin
14. Charlotte Rose Kirylo, Executive Director, Children’s Helpers in Lawful Defense
15. Ryan Saint Michael, Chairman, National Committee People’s Prison
PASSAIC COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE
PATERSON, NEW JERSEY

APRIL 12, 1994

1. Superior Court Judge Carmen Ferrante, Passaic County
2. Elliot Collins, President, Passaic County Community College
3. Mayor William Pascrell, Paterson
4. Al Moody, Director Paterson Youth Service Bureau, Founder, "Total Lifestyle and Support Program"
5. Two former juvenile offenders
6. Michael O'Shea, Assistant Prosecutor, Passaic County
7. Detective Donald Reading, Paterson Police
8. George Yefchek, Skillman Parole Board
9. Derrick Laury, Wagner Rehabilitation Center
10. George Sullivan, Director, Probationfields
11. Wendy Kovell
12. Therese Matthews, Program Development Specialist, Division of Operations
13. Sheila Thomas, Assistant Superintendent, New Jersey Training School for Boys, Jamesburg
14. Jack Cuttre, Superintendent, Juvenile Medium Security Facility
16. Dr. Anna DeMolli
VINELAND CITY HALL
VINELAND, NEW JERSEY

MAY 4, 1994

1. Hon. Joseph Romano, Mayor, Vineland
2. Senator William Gormley
3. Mayor Robert Shannon, Millville
4. Michael Brooke Fisher, Cumberland County Prosecutor
5. James Harris
6. Hon. Art Marchand, Freeholder, Cumberland County
7. Hon. Jennifer Lookabaugh, Cumberland County Freeholder & Principal
   Mount Pleasant School
8. Stephen Moore, Prosecutor, Cape May County
9. Hon. Jim Plousis, Sheriff, Cape May County
10. Hon. Laura Pizzo, Mayor, Deerfield Township, Bridgeton
11. Police Chief John Biondi
12. Hon. Donald Olbrich, Councilman
13. Hon. Joseph Santagata, Councilman, Buena Borough
14. Detective Michael P. Brogan, Lower Township Police
15. Sharon Bloom
16. Larry Starnes
17. Margaret Bitters, Psychologist, Vineland Board of Education
18. Steve Plevins, Juvenile Counselor, Vineland Residential Center
19. Tom McCann, Principal, Landis School
20. Barry Bruner, Mutual Aid Emergency Services
21. Stephanie Perlstein, Supervisor, DYFS
22. Sonny Alexenberg
23. Margaret Davis
24. Dina Murray, Resident of Vineland
25. George Williams
26. Terrence Coursey, Associate Executive Director, Martin Luther King
    Academy/Chairman of the Cumberland County Youth Services Committee

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MIDDLESEX COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE
EDISON, NEW JERSEY

JUNE 22, 1994

1. Casimir Kowalczyk
2. Ann Orenstein, Toughlove
3. Vivian Jonas, Toughlove
4. Dolores Levan
Highlights of the testimony heard by the Task Force are represented by the following summaries:

March 22, 1994
Public Hearing
Monmouth County Library

Monmouth County Prosecutor John Kaye told the Task Force that he believed juvenile court records should be open to public inspection, but that he was doubtful that the threat of publicity would act to deter serious offenders. He expressed his opposition to the idea (raised by some commentators on the juvenile justice system) that increasing the number of juvenile cases "waived" out of family court and into criminal court would lead to more appropriate punishments in serious cases. He noted that the waiver process is lengthy and expensive for the prosecution and for the State as well, since it involves additional court proceedings, and since most juvenile defendants are represented by the Public Defender's office rather than private attorneys. He felt that it should be the sole responsibility of the prosecutor, who is familiar with the case and with the chances of conviction, to decide in which cases waiver should be attempted.

He stated that in Monmouth County, 6,000 juveniles were arrested every year, resulting in formal charges against 2,500 of them: out of these, waiver was sought in perhaps 20 cases.
Carolyn Meuly, Middlesex County assistant prosecutor, expressed agreement with Monmouth County Prosecutor John Kaye on the waiver issue, saying that the decision to waive a case should be left to the prosecutor’s discretion. She noted that some juveniles whose cases are waived will be treated more leniently in criminal court than in family court: In criminal court, plea bargains can result in downgraded charges and smaller sentences, and when a case involving a particularly young-looking juvenile goes to trial, the jury might be swayed into returning a not-guilty verdict, she noted. Ms. Meuly also suggested that the penalties for relatively minor offenses, such as trespass, vandalism and assault, be increased if they are committed in and around schools, based on the same rationale behind the statute that imposes harsher penalties for drug dealing in school zones: that schools must remain safe havens for children.*

Roy Patterson, a Manalapan resident who works with “Safe Streets, Inc.” in Washington, D.C., stated that the focus on reform and parole over the past 20 years has not been successful. Because parolees and repeat offenders are responsible for a very large proportion of crime, just eliminating parole would decrease the crime rate significantly, he said.

* P.L.1994, c.90, enacted August 9, 1994, puts one of these suggestions into effect. Introduced in the Legislature on March 21, 1994 in response to the Amanda Wengert murder, the new statute upgrades criminal trespass to a crime of the fourth degree when it is committed in schools or on school property. Prior to the enactment, criminal trespass in schools was a disorderly persons offense.
April 12, 1994

Public Hearing

Passaic County Community College

Superior Court Judge Carmen Ferrante, the Presiding Judge of the Family Division in Passaic County, described the heavy caseloads involving juveniles in that county and the procedures in juvenile cases. He stated that the family court in that county handled 5,286 cases involving juveniles in the past year (out of a total of 21,375 cases in the family court), and noted that Passaic County is currently operating with only six family court judges, instead of the eight that are needed. The procedure in a juvenile case is as follows, he said: after a juvenile is arrested, he may be detained. The county also has a home detention program, similar to house arrest, which relieves overcrowding in the detention center. Within two days, the juvenile goes before the judge for a "probable cause" hearing to determine whether further proceedings are necessary. If so, a trial must be held within the next 30 days, and the court orders a disposition within 45 days. If a juvenile is not detained, the case may be "diverted" from the court system. He noted that 25% of all juvenile cases in Passaic County are diverted.
a great deal of community service work. Mr. Moody was accompanied by two former juvenile offenders who had graduated from the program. (Their names were not disclosed.) Both youths stressed the importance of such programs, and stated that aftercare programs and job training were urgently needed as well.

Mr. Moody noted that community programs present the State with cost savings, since the alternative -- incarceration in a secure facility such as Jamesburg -- costs approximately $30,000 per year per juvenile.

Passaic County Assistant Prosecutor Michael O'Shea discussed the breakdown of society and the decline of the family as social forces that help cause juvenile crime. He stated his hopes that society's attitudes towards violence could be changed through social pressures, just as our attitudes towards cigarette smoking have dramatically changed because of social pressures. He agreed with the previous speakers on the pressing need for programs that involve juveniles in the community.

Detective Donald Reading of the Paterson Police Department also stressed the need for well-supervised community programs, and suggested that juveniles could perform needed tasks like cleaning up parks and schools and removing graffiti. He also stated that interventions were needed to help youths who had not yet committed crimes and so were not yet involved in the juvenile justice system. Parents had expressed their frustrations to him that their children were uncontrollable, yet the system could not do anything to help until it was too late.
Dr. Anna DeMolli, who works in the Paterson public school system, stated that the schools have the potential to be community resources and rehabilitative systems, since the structure already set in place in each community. She said there is a need for after school programs as well as more programs that come into the schools during the school day.
May 4, 1994
Public Hearing
Vineland City Hall

Vineland Mayor Joseph Romano stated that the community was frustrated with the juvenile justice system's failure to deal with violent offenders. (Mr. Romano was referring to the brutal murders that had occurred in March, where an elderly Vineland couple was stabbed and shot to death during a burglary in their home by three teenagers with extensive juvenile records.)

Michael Brooke Fisher, Cumberland County Prosecutor, supported pending legislation that would allow broader disclosure of juvenile's names, and stated that he favored further measures: when juveniles aged 16 or 17 are charged with first or second degree crimes (like the teenagers charged in the Vineland murders), all proceedings should be open to the public."

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* Pursuant to P.L.1994, c.54, enacted June 29, 1994, access to juvenile records has been increased. As amended by the enactment, N.J.S.A.2A:44A-60 now provides that identifying information concerning juveniles adjudicated delinquent shall be disclosed to the public unless the juvenile demonstrates a substantial likelihood that specific and extraordinary harm would result from such disclosure in the specific case.
June 22, 1994

Public Hearing

Middlesex County Community College

Vivian Jonas of the Toughlove organization stated that there is a need for programs which would follow up with juveniles who are released from incarceration. She also suggested that the courts try to impose creative sentencing on minor offenders, such as requiring that they spend a weekend in a locked facility; this would at least send the juvenile the message that society takes their infractions seriously.
APPENDIX II

BACKGROUND MATERIALS

A-1, A-2: Assembly Resolutions No. 49 and 81
B: New Jersey Statutes: Authorized Dispositions for Juveniles
C-1, C-2: New Jersey Statistics: Juvenile Arrests 1993
E-1, E-2: New Jersey expenditures: Juvenile correctional facilities and community programs

STUDIES ENDORSED BY THE TASK FORCE

F: Juvenile Delinquency Commission: "Restructuring Services for Delinquent Youth"
G: Juvenile Delinquency Commission: "The Future of New Jersey's Juvenile Justice System"
H: "The Regimented Juvenile Training Program" (Colorado)
I: National Conference of State Legislatures: "Juvenile Justice Reform: State Experiences"
AN ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION creating an Assembly Task Force
on Juvenile Crime.

WHEREAS, According to the 1992 Uniform Crime Report - Crime in New Jersey, there were almost 89,000 juvenile
arrests in New Jersey in 1992; and
WHEREAS, Juveniles now account for over one in every five
arrests in the State; and
WHEREAS, According to data compiled by the Juvenile
Delinquency Commission (the "JDC"), New Jersey ranks fifth
in the nation in the total number of juvenile arrests and fourth
in the arrest rate for serious violent offenses; and
WHEREAS, The JDC further reports that in 1992, New Jersey's
six most populated cities (with about 14% of the youth
population) accounted for 37% of juvenile arrests for serious
violent crime and 54% of arrests for selling drugs; and
WHEREAS, The present system of juvenile justice is fragmented
and overwhelmed by violent and repeat offenders, and
WHEREAS, Juvenile facilities are plagued with overcrowding and
the system is struggling to provide rehabilitative services; now,
therefore,

BE IT RESOLVED by the General Assembly of the State of
New Jersey:
1. There is created a task force of the General Assembly to
study and make recommendations concerning juvenile offenders
and the juvenile justice system. The task force shall meet as
soon as practicable after the appointment of its members.
2. The task force shall consist of seven Assembly members,
not more than five of whom shall be members of the same party.
The Speaker of the General Assembly shall appoint a chairperson
from among the task force members. The members of the task
force shall appoint a secretary who need not be a member of the
task force. Vacancies in the membership shall be filled in the
same manner as the original appointments were made.
3. The task force may meet and hold hearings at any place or
places it shall designate during the sessions or recesses of the
General Assembly. The task force shall hold three public
hearings which shall be open to members of the general public as
well as experts on juvenile delinquency and rehabilitation of
juvenile offenders.
4. The task force shall report its findings to the General
Assembly and to the Governor upon completion of its work, but
not later than three months after the passage of this resolution.
AN ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION extending the Task Force on Juvenile Crime.

WHEREAS. The Assembly Task Force on Juvenile Crime was created by Assembly Resolution No. 49, enacted on March 10, 1994; and

WHEREAS. The Task Force is charged with studying and making recommendations concerning juvenile offenders and the juvenile justice system; and

WHEREAS. The Task Force is required to hold public hearings in order to elicit testimony from experts on juvenile delinquency and the rehabilitation of juvenile offenders as well as from the general public; and

WHEREAS. The Task Force must report its findings to the General Assembly and to the Governor upon completion of its work, but not later than three months after the passage of Assembly Resolution No. 49, accompanying its report with any legislation or recommendations for legislation which it may desire to have adopted by the Legislature; and

WHEREAS. The Task Force has held a number of public hearings and received testimony from many witnesses, including those with expertise in the field of juvenile justice as well as members of the general public; and

WHEREAS. The members of the Task Force, upon consideration of the witnesses' testimony and upon study of the issues involved, have agreed that the problem of juvenile crime is complex, and that any proposed solutions need careful and deliberate consideration; and

WHEREAS. The members of the Task Force have determined that the three month deadline for completion of their work is insufficient, given the difficult nature of the task; now, therefore.

BE IT RESOLVED by the General Assembly of the State of New Jersey:

1. The deadline for completion of the work of the Assembly Task Force on Juvenile Crime is hereby extended an additional 60 days, so that the Task Force must complete its work and issue a final report by August 10, 1994.

STATEMENT

This resolution would extend the life of the Assembly Task Force on Juvenile Crime an additional 60 days. The Task Force,
NEW JERSEY STATUTES

AUTHORIZED DISPOSITIONS:
JUVENILES CHARGED WITH DELINQUENCY
AND JUVENILES ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT
## ARREST TRENDS BY AGE GROUP—1992-1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFENSES</th>
<th>UNDER 18 YEARS OF AGE</th>
<th>18 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>+17</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>1,941</td>
<td>2,019</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>3,975</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aggravated Assault</td>
<td>3,097</td>
<td>3,185</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>11,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>4,318</td>
<td>4,041</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>6,873</td>
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<tr>
<td>Larceny-Theft</td>
<td>13,959</td>
<td>12,528</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>29,549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicle Theft</td>
<td>1,726</td>
<td>1,519</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td>1,232</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal Index Offenses</strong></td>
<td>25,331</td>
<td>23,590</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>54,277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manslaughter</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>†</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple Assault</td>
<td>9,604</td>
<td>9,669</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>32,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arson</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>-21</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forger and Counterfiting</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>-32</td>
<td>1,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>-17</td>
<td>6,144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embezzlement</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>†</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stolen Property; Buying, Receiving, Possessing, etc.</td>
<td>4,587</td>
<td>3,787</td>
<td>-17</td>
<td>6,971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal/Malicious Mischief</td>
<td>7,902</td>
<td>6,608</td>
<td>-16</td>
<td>5,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons; Carrying, Possessing, etc.</td>
<td>2,563</td>
<td>2,936</td>
<td>+15</td>
<td>5,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prostitution and Commercialized Vice</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>+10</td>
<td>2,516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex Offenses (Except Rape and Prostitution)</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1,977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Abuse Violations</td>
<td>5,149</td>
<td>5,889</td>
<td>+14</td>
<td>41,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambling</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-23</td>
<td>517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offenses Against Family and Children</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-41</td>
<td>14,855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driving Under the Influence</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>+7</td>
<td>35,755</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liquor Laws</td>
<td>3,535</td>
<td>2,777</td>
<td>-21</td>
<td>7,414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disorderly Conduct</td>
<td>10,245</td>
<td>10,081</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>29,054</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vagrancy</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>-23</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other Offenses (Except Traffic)</td>
<td>10,741</td>
<td>10,104</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>72,563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curfew and Loitering Law Violations</td>
<td>1,950</td>
<td>2,157</td>
<td>+11</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runaways</td>
<td>5,642</td>
<td>5,853</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GRAND TOTAL**

| UNDER 18 YEARS OF AGE | 1992 | 1993 | -4 | 318,125| 315,661| -1 |

*Less than one-half of one percent.
±Percent change not calculated due to small volume.

(Uniform Crime Report, 1993)
(New Jersey)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFENSES</th>
<th>UNDER 18</th>
<th>10-12</th>
<th>13-14</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>16</th>
<th>17</th>
<th>TOTAL UNDER 18</th>
<th>18</th>
<th>TOTAL OVER 18</th>
<th>TOTAL ALL AGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>42</td>
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*NEW JERSEY STATISTICS*
Tools for prevention

The key principles for preventing and reducing juvenile delinquency are:
- strengthening families;
- supporting core social institutions;
- intervening immediately when delinquent behavior occurs; and
- identifying and controlling the small percentage of serious, violent and chronic juvenile offenders.

A Philadelphia study (Wolfgang, Figlio and Sellin, 1972) found that chronic offenders (five or more police contacts) made up 6 percent of the cohort, or age group, and 18 percent were responsible for 62 percent of all offenses and about two-thirds of all violent offenses.

Source: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

Gunning for trouble

More than 1,400 children die each year from guns — a number that has more than doubled in eight years. This means that 120 children under 18 are killed by gunfire each month. In 1992, a gun was used in more than 60 percent of child homicides.

Youth themselves contribute to the problem. A survey of 1,600 male students in 10 inner-city high schools found that 22 percent owned a gun. The most common was a semiautomatic handgun.

Juvenile legislation

As of May 1994, many states had pending legislation on a variety of juvenile justice issues:
- boot camps — eight states, with a total of 11 bills;
- firearm restrictions — 16 states with a total of 62 bills;
- gangs — seven states, with a total of 12 bills; and
- school safety — 10 states, with a total of 35 bills.

Source: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

Survey source: The Epidemic of Violence in the Schools, National School Boards Association
## JUVENILE AND YOUTH CORRECTIONS
### FY 1995 APPROPRIATIONS

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>DIRECT SERVICES</th>
<th>CAPITAL</th>
<th>FEDERAL</th>
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E - 1
# N J YOUTH & JUVENILE CORRECTIONAL POPULATION

## ANNUAL PER CAPITA COSTS

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Youth Institutions</th>
<th>FY 1994 Population</th>
<th>FY 1994 Per Capita</th>
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<tr>
<td>Garden State Reception and Youth Correctional Facility</td>
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<td>Mountainview Youth Correctional Facility</td>
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<th>Juvenile Institutions - DOC</th>
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<td><strong>Subtotal Institutional Pop</strong></td>
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<td><strong>TOTAL YOUTH &amp; JUVENILE POPULATION</strong></td>
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*Note: Youth Institutions house offenders between the ages of 18 and 26
Juvenile Institutions house offenders under the age of 18*
Restructuring Services for Delinquent Youth

The following summarizes the recent recommendations of a Task Force of the Cabinet Action Group on Juvenile Justice. The report is part of an emerging blueprint that should be presented in full in the near future.

The last major reform of New Jersey's juvenile justice system came in 1983 with the revised Code of Juvenile Justice and the constitutional amendment creating a family court. Since then, the Juvenile Delinquency Commission has monitored the system and recommended a number of strategies for further change.

One of our key concerns has been the insufficient supply of good local programs, especially in our urban centers. We also pointed out that the juvenile justice system is fragmented and poorly organized—a major reason for the slow pace of local program development. One problem is that the responsibilities of state agencies and their roles vis-à-vis local government (and the private sector) are simply not defined.

Poor organization has contributed to slow progress in developing a local response to delinquency.

Within this broader context, the executive branch has examined various proposals to reorganize the existing structure for responding to delinquent youth. In March of 1991, a Cabinet Action Group was developed to spur greater coordination and efficiencies of executive agencies, with an eye toward determining how existing dollars might be redistributed or "redeployed" to get maximum impact. The Action Group has focused on four key areas: increasing dispositional options for delinquent youth; increasing the use of alternatives to training schools; increasing the availability of drug treatment programs; and expanding prevention services for at-risk youth.

One recommendation coming from the Group was for the creation of an Office of Youth Services (OYS) to oversee the State's shifting policy direction. And a Task Force on Community Services and Dispositional Alternatives worked to outline how a local service network could be designed to support the goals and objectives of the proposed OYS. The Task Force has now released its final report under the chairmanship of William Waldman, Assistant Commissioner of the Department of Human Services. We summarize findings and recommendations of the "Waldman Report" below.

The Waldman Report

The focus of the Task Force was to address the array of community services that should be available to support the proposed OYS and to explore how levels of government could interact with community groups—in other words, what should be available and where should responsibility for service delivery lie. The youth population targeted by the Task Force includes all juveniles adjudicated delinquent as well as youth "at risk" of involvement with the family court. Special attention is to be paid to urban and minority issues.

The Task Force looked at what services should be available and where responsibility for service delivery should lie.

The Task Force delineated a series of principles to guide future action:

- We need to develop a full spectrum of services and sanctions for youths and their families. (The report provides a model for such a continuum in the form of a "matrix" of interventions that vary in intensity.) There needs to be flexible funding, conducive to the use of alternative dispositions that provide both "holistic" and individualized interventions.
Our juvenile system is currently receiving an uncommon amount of scrutiny by lawmakers. As in times past, there is once again a widespread feeling that the system is not working very well, and that improvements are needed. And a number of reforms have been proposed.

When lawmakers look at proposed reforms, they are likely to be concerned with issues relating to public safety, costs, and the likelihood of curtailing further crime. And because lawmakers will likely be asked to participate in a new set of reforms in the near future, it is useful to provide some “perspective” — a look back at the recent past and a look forward to the future. This perspective can help guide future efforts.

It is likely that lawmakers will be asked to participate in a new set of juvenile justice system reforms in the near future.

JUST YESTERDAY

Our last major effort at reform occurred in 1983. It involved two related reforms: passage of a substantially revised Juvenile Justice Code and creation of a Family Court. Both were a reaction to pervasive concerns over perceived system shortcomings: judges with few dispositional options; a system handling too many minor delinquency situations that might best be handled in an alternative manner; a system closed to public scrutiny and, some claimed, soft on serious juvenile crime; a system lacking in uniformity and fairness; and a system failing to deal with delinquency as a family-related problem.

The last major reform came in 1983 with the Code of Juvenile Justice.

Legislators set out to develop solutions. What emerged was a bill described by the following Senate Judiciary Committee statement:

This bill recognizes that the public welfare and the best interests of juveniles can be served most effectively through an approach which provides for harsher penalties for juveniles who commit serious acts or who are repetitive offenders, while broadening family responsibility and the use of alternative dispositions for juveniles committing less serious offenses.

While space does not allow for a review of all the objectives of the Code (past Commission reports provide this), several key thrusts are important to note. Among other things, the Code
Largely lost in the current debates on deinstitutionalization is a discussion of the role of local government.

Largely lost in this current debate, however, is an issue that bears heavily on the long-term health of the juvenile justice system—should we continue to increase direct state administrative responsibility for correctional needs or should we develop a "new partnership" strategy that re-focuses responsibility for providing many delinquency-related services at the local level?

TOMORROW – Where to Next?

Looking to the future, it’s useful to separate the task of juvenile justice into two sets of challenges—treatment challenges, and administrative and management challenges.

We are now confronted with two separate issues – how we should organize our system and what programs we should stress.

Treatment. One of our core concerns must be about the approaches needed to turn juvenile offenders around. Whether we aim to “rehabilitate” them or to deter them by “getting them the message,” the fact is that our technology for changing the behavior of young people remains limited.

The good news is that solid research across the country is beginning to identify approaches that appear to work for many delinquent youths. The future will demand that we learn more about which of these approaches works best and for which specific types of youths. In short, we need to know what’s working.

Surprisingly, while we continue to develop new delinquency programs and fund old ones, we spend little time really examining what really works. We often just assume that our well-intentioned interventions are “doing right by our kids.” But thoughtful observers of the system will tell you that despite the efforts, the results are a big question mark. This means that in the future, policymakers will need to demand a practical research agenda that will guide their funding decisions.

Management. Even with treatment answers, real progress in improving our juvenile justice system will come only once important management issues are addressed. Six starting points deserve particular attention:

- Organize the system better
- Stress a real continuum of options
- Focus attention locally
- Provide incentives
- Stress accountability
- Focus more attention on the chronic offender

Each of these points requires some brief elaboration below.

At present, we are simply not organized to deal well with delinquency. We need to organize our system better. The roles of various agencies and levels of government are not clearly defined. We need a thorough reexamination of who does what in the system, from top to bottom. The proposed Office of Youth Services could be a
The Regimented Juvenile Training Program

REBOUND CAMP FALCON

FEBRUARY 25, 1994
REGIMENTED JUVENILE TRAINING ("BOOT CAMP") PROGRAM
(HB 93S-1005, CRS 19-2-708)

GUIDELINES

Criteria

- Adjudicated delinquent males sentenced to Regimented Juvenile Training as a condition of probation.
- Between the ages of 12 and 18.
- Psychologically stable, able to handle a confrontational, disciplinary milieu.
- Physically able to participate in an intensive physical training regimen.

Program Entry Procedures

Initial Sentence

- Probation prepares a pre-sentence report. In the process of considering options the probation officer would determine general program eligibility and appropriateness. If RJTP were to be considered, the juvenile would be referred to the Division of Youth Services through the regional detention center for a "physical and mental assessment". [CRS 19-2-708 (2)(b)] The probation officer must allow 14 calendar days for the Division of Youth Services to complete the assessment.
- Probation will contact the Rebound Staff at the boot camp located at the Lookout Mountain Youth Services Center to confirm space availability and start up schedule.
- Probation to include the above mentioned eligibility information and start schedule in the pre-sentence report.

Revocation of Probation

- Probation prepares a pre-placement data summary. If in the process of considering options the probation officer determined that the juvenile were appropriate for RJTP, he would be referred to the Division of Youth Services through the regional detention center for a "physical and mental assessment". [CRS 19-2-708(2)(b)] The probation officer must allow 14 calendar days for the Division of Youth Services to complete the assessment.
- Probation will contact the Rebound Staff at the boot camp located at the Lookout Mountain Youth Services Center to confirm space availability and start up schedule.
- Probation to include the above mentioned eligibility information and start schedule in the pre-placement data summary.
Phase Two

Following the graduation ceremony the juvenile shall be released to the parent, guardian, or court-assigned supervisor for transportation to home or other court-designated residence.

The Phase Two plan shall be determined at the 30 day staffing while the youth is in Phase One. The plan shall consider the following services as spelled out in the enabling legislation:

- Period of supervision.
- Job training (as deemed appropriate by the Judicial Department).
- Educational component (as deemed appropriate by the Judicial Department) which shall include classroom work with basic and/or vocational instruction.
- Electronic monitoring (optional) [no more than 60 statewide at a time].
- Community residential placement (optional) [no more than 20 statewide at a time].

When a 30 day residential stay is deemed necessary in the joint case plan, this should be ordered by the court after the 30 day staffing. The probation officer will be responsible for case management services. Reimbursement would be made form the districts allocation for this purpose. If the court is aware at the time for the original sentencing to the RJTP of the need for residential placement following phase one then the mittimus could include the order for the 30 day stay.

Upon completion of Phase Two, the juvenile shall be reviewed by the court for further disposition of the case.

Phase II Violation Response:

Violations in Phase Two may be referred back to the court. The court may re-sentence the juvenile one additional time or impose any other sentence option available by statute.
Contact: Bill Botkin, Rebound 861-9717 or Jerry Adamek, DYS 762-4695

For Immediate Release
3/9/94

Rebound Corporation to Operate Lookout Mountain Juvenile Boot Camp

DENVER—The Colorado Division of Youth Services (DYS) announced today that it has selected Denver-based Rebound Corporation to operate the state’s new juvenile boot-camp. Camp Falcon will be located on the grounds of the Lookout Mountain Youth Services Center in Golden and is scheduled to open in mid-April.

When fully operational, the program can facilitate approximately 80 juveniles between the ages of 12 and 18 years. Based on a 60-day training schedule, the $1.4 million program will serve 480 juveniles annually.

"Judges in Colorado now can intervene very quickly with youth in the juvenile court process with a very significant consequence for delinquency behavior," said Jerry Adamek, division director, Colorado Division of Youth Services. "This will be no slap on the wrist! This experience should provide an early opportunity for kids to reassess their own behavior."

"We have been successfully treating youths from DYS for nearly five years at our High Plains Youth Center in Brush," said Jane O'Shaugnessy, Rebound chief executive officer. "Camp Falcon is a different approach to a similar goal — to help these young men develop discipline through a highly structured program and physical exercise and to provide the programs and education they need to redirect their lives in a more positive way."

(more)
boot camp 3-3-3-3

A typical day at Camp Falcon begins at 5:00 a.m. with formation, roll call, salute to the colors, calisthenics, barracks clean up and inspection. Breakfast is followed by school, special classes or facility maintenance. After lunch, more classes, KP duty, intramural games, mandatory letter writing to family, and personal hygiene. Final roll call, taps and lights out are at 9:00 p.m.

Nationally, the success rate for boot-camp correctional facilities is 50 percent. Rebound hopes to exceed that mark through a strong aftercare program provided by the Colorado State Judicial Department. Vern Fogg, administrator of the Office of Probation Services, agrees that aftercare is essential to the success of youths in the program.

"It appears universally accepted that behavioral change attributed to the boot camp environment is short-term unless highly structured supervision and individually targeted aftercare services are provided to the youths and their families," Fogg said. "Without a continuum of structured services, the boot camp experiment will provide only the illusion of progressive corrections, while having little effect upon recidivism."

"We want this program to be a harsh reality check for these young men," O'Shaughnessy said. "We want them to think about what they did to get into Camp Falcon and to teach them the social and mental reasoning skills they need to change their lives and to prepare them for the successful completion of the aftercare program."

Rebound Corporation is a Colorado-based provider of offense-specific treatment and training programs for juvenile offenders. Rebound provides programs through contract with governmental agencies or as a facility owner/operator.

###
INTRODUCTION
Since early in the 19th century, a special government role in the treatment of youths in the juvenile justice system has been recognized. The philosophy of "parisons patinae," or "common guardian of the community," gave states great latitude in treating juveniles while severely limiting their legal rights.

State government responded to this special responsibility by establishing training or industrial schools, large institutions designed to rehabilitate their charges through moral training, discipline, education, and job skills.

But throughout their lengthy history, industrial schools have been the setting for scandals concerning the treatment of their residents. Overcrowding, mixing of violent and nonviolent youth, brutality, the use of isolation cells, and inmate violence have fueled calls for reform and frequent litigation.

Most important, industrial schools have failed to rehabilitate their charges. Increased criminality by those released has led to doubts about these institutions' usefulness and fears that they are now part of the problem.

States as diverse demographically and politically as Massachusetts and Utah have pioneered the deinstitutionalization of adjudicated youths and closure of state training schools in favor of small, intensive, secure facilities for fewer serious offenders and community-based services for those who do not pose a risk to the public. Although some of these programs are too new to evaluate definitively, early assessments indicate that the movement away from the use of training schools can reduce juvenile costs and criminal activity without increasing the threat to the public.

These new alternatives separate the few violent and serious repeat offenders from status offenders (those offenses, such as running away from home and truancy, would not be considered crimes if committed by adults) and lesser offenders. The most serious offenders, estimated at less than 20 percent of youth in the juvenile justice system, are sent to small, secure facilities, usually for longer lengths of stay than in traditional training school programs. Other offenders are placed in residential programs or remain in their homes while under state supervision. All receive services—often from private, nonprofit agencies—based on evaluations of individual need.

This paper looks at the challenges facing states in juvenile justice, the alternatives to large institutions that states can use, experiences in several states that have embraced deinstitutionalization, and formal evaluations of the effectiveness of reform.

THE PROBLEM FACING STATES
A series of issues confront legislators as they examine their juvenile justice systems. Many of these issues may intensify in the coming decade with a larger population of youth being in the high-risk years for juvenile crime. The expected, demographically driven increase in the number of crimes committed by juveniles may be exacerbated by already changing social characteristics. Today, 25 percent of all kids live in poverty, school dropout and teen pregnancy rates are increasing, there are more single parents, and a changing economy makes it more difficult for those without skills to compete for jobs. [7, p. 18]

Between 1977 and 1986, juvenile arrests dropped 12 percent, and the number of juveniles held for violent crimes decreased 11 percent between 1983 and 1987. These reductions, however, reflect a smaller teen population. Yet, the number held for drug and alcohol offenses increased more than 50 percent between 1985 and 1987. Despite the overall decrease in arrests for juvenile crime over the past decade, the number of juveniles in custody has grown to its highest level since 1971. In 1987, the average daily census of juveniles held in state and local custody was 55,503 juveniles in 1,107 public facilities. (See Table 1.) Longer lengths of stay have contributed to this increase. [11, p. 22]

Costs have increased, too. State and local governments spent $1.46 billion on juvenile facilities in 1986, an average of $27,000 per resident, up 32 percent from 1982.

Several studies of state training schools have shown that more than half of the juveniles in such facilities do not need to be there. For example, a 1987 study conducted by the auditor general of Florida found that less than 40 percent of the youth in Florida's institutions qualified for training school placement under the agency's own criteria. [15] A recent report on the California Youth Authority system concluded that 50 percent of total wards of the authority could have been diverted if community-based alternatives had been available. [12] The residents of Delaware's only training school were rated on a 10-point risk scale, with "0" representing no risk. Of 135 juveniles in the facility, 21 percent scored "0" and 44 scored "1."

Many reformatories have at least some abused and neglected children or status offenders who can best be treated in the community at less cost. Most others are guilty of property crimes such as theft and vandalism. Fewer than one-fourth are guilty of offenses against people. (See Figure 1.) Mixing these populations in an institution can result in brutality among inmates and runs counter to efforts to rehabilitate them.
respect to the placement of adjudicated youths. In recent years, however, some states have moved to limit this discretion, particularly with respect to the decision to confine a youth in a secure facility. For example, courts may be required to consider the recommendations of an advisory group or personnel from youth corrections agencies. In eight states (Arkansas, Alaska, Illinois, Kansas, Montana, New Mexico, Texas, and Vermont), youth corrections agencies make placement decisions. The move to limit broad judicial discretion comes in response to concerns about the potential for inequitable, capricious, or disproportionate sentences; the need for due process protections; and a desire to control juvenile justice system costs better. [15, pp. 2-5]

Helping the juvenile offender and his family. Juvenile offenders often come from dysfunctional families and from backgrounds of abuse and neglect. Improving the relationship of the juvenile to his family and providing advice on parenting skills may reduce criminal behavior and benefit society as well as the offender and his family.

OPTIONS FOR PLACEMENT OF CONVICTED JUVENILE OFFENDERS

Traditionally, juvenile justice systems provide few options for placement of convicted offenders. Large state training institutions function as the major alternative to probation for all offenders, regardless of the nature of the crime and the needs of the juvenile.

New reform alternatives are designed to emphasize individual treatment of problem juveniles. A range of settings and services allows placement where rehabilitation can be maximized and costs minimized. Violent youth can be sent to small, secure facilities that offer intensive counseling and services. Most of the other young offenders can be placed in family-like residential settings or their own homes, where appropriate supervision can be tailored to individual needs, avoiding costs for unnecessary services.

Placement decisions are usually based on evaluations made with an objective risk/needs assessment instrument. Violent offenders guilty of manslaughter, rape, aggravated assault, or escape from secure facilities are automatically sent to secure facilities. Other factors used in the evaluation include seriousness of the offense, previous arrests, drug and alcohol use, and whether the juvenile was on probation at the time of the crime.

Services for juvenile offenders that may be utilized in community settings include behavioral supervision, individual counseling, school placement, reward systems, recreational activities, parent and family counseling, drug and alcohol treatment and counseling, social skills training, youth groups, and sometimes camping or programs such as Outward Bound. Other, less frequently used services include tutoring, job placement, job counseling, and community service.

Placement alternatives include detention centers, transfer to adult courts, secure facilities, observation and assessment facilities.
whose parents don't want them at home. Utah's Proctor Advocate program may place one or two problem juveniles in the proctor's home. The proctor acts as a parent. A counselor also works with these youth and provides support and advice to the proctor. A caseworker may see his charge three to seven times a week and will have a caseload of five to eight children. The youth, proctor, and caseworker determine a treatment plan that is treated as a contract with the youth.

Group homes take care of a much larger number of juveniles, perhaps as many as 25. Residents earn privileges by staying out of trouble, performing their assigned responsibilities, participating, and having a good attitude. But residents often object to locating group homes in their neighborhoods, causing some to be located in areas distant from the juveniles' homes. In addition to being sometimes poorly trained, staff are usually overworked and underpaid, causing high turnover and another source of instability in the juvenile's life.

In-home placement. The least expensive alternative, this placement often includes a "tracking" component as well as an individualized treatment program. Caseworkers are assigned to make frequent contacts with their charges to ensure that juveniles are attending school, meeting job responsibilities, and honoring curfews. In addition, restitution may be required by the juvenile.

Broward County, Florida, is experimenting with two tracking programs. Intensive supervision features a one-to-ten caseworker load and requires seven random face-to-face contacts between caseworker and juvenile offender each week. Juveniles must telephone their caseworker to get permission to go anywhere. Highly intensive supervision requires four face-to-face contacts daily at work, home, or school. The offender wears an electronic monitor on his wrist, which, when a caseworker phones, must be attached to the phone within 30 seconds.

STATE REFORM EFFORTS

Massachusetts pioneered the deinstitutionalization of juvenile offenders. After three years of failed attempts to reform the state's five training schools housing 1,200 juveniles, the state decided to close the facilities in 1972.

Fifteen years later, Massachusetts places 10 percent of offenders in secure facilities, fewer than any other state except Vermont. Massachusetts has an institutionalization rate of only 42 per 100,000 population over age 10, compared with a national average of 206. (See Figure 1.) The state's largest secure facility has only 18 beds.

Edward J. Loughran, commissioner of the Department of Youth Services, says, "We are taking a certain amount of risk by putting some youths in the community-based programs." But, he adds, the key is knowing the risk and selecting the right program.

Judges commit juveniles to the Department of Youth Services rather than to a particular facility. Of the 1,700 juveniles under the department at any one time, 900 reside at home.

Youth service workers report that 50 percent of these youth do not return to criminal activity, a rate much better than the national statistics show. Perhaps more important, 10 years after deinstitutionalization, graduates of the juvenile justice system account for only 19 percent of
Maryland began reforming its juvenile justice system in 1987. While a lawsuit calling for closure of a state reformatory was pending, the state called in an outside consulting team to evaluate the system, specifying special attention to be given to the two reformatories.

The consultants declared that the system had become "a child welfare system" rather than "an agency which responds to juveniles who have broken the law." Montrose School had become the residence for "victimized, homeless, addicted, mentally ill, educationally handicapped, developmentally disabled children." The other school, Hickey, was found to have ceded much authority to juvenile inmates and sometimes to control inmates through psychotropic drugs and antidepressive medication. [8, p. 22]

State legislators and Maryland Governor William Schaefer visited Montrose shortly after the report and ordered the facility phased out.

Nine million dollars from the Montrose School budget were redirected to community programs, assessment teams, and other programs that attempt to rehabilitate youth. Linda D'Amario Rossi, director of the Maryland Juvenile Services Agency, says, "We haven't asked the legislature for one penny more. We just use the dollars differently."

Individual treatment plans were developed for 118 juveniles diverted from the Montrose facility in its last six months. After 10 months, 38 had been rearrested, a figure substantially lower than that for training schools.

Maryland state Senator Francis Kelly, a leader in the reform movement, says he is "very enthusiastic about the direction we're going. I believe that the solution to jail and prison overcrowding in the future is to help our young people today."

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EVALUATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORMS

The move to greater use of community-based alternatives for juvenile offenders is relatively recent, and the limited number of evaluations has shown mixed results. Evaluations usually look at costs and the rate of recidivism. But the time periods of the evaluation are generally short, just a few years. Longer term impacts, such as the criminality of adults who were in the juvenile justice system, are largely unavailable.

Massachusetts has the oldest and most evaluated state program. Evaluations have been completed by the Harvard University Center for Criminal Justice and the National Council on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD). The Harvard evaluation, headed by Lloyd Ohlin, compared a group from reformatories and a group from community-based programs. Recidivism was defined as a court reappearance or conviction. The study did not make distinctions between the number or seriousness of the new offenses.

The Harvard study found that recidivism was about the same for both groups but varied greatly between different regions of the state. A 1985 book by Ohlin and Miller, Delinquency and Community, found that recidivism statewide was higher after the reform than before but was lower in the regions that pursued the reforms most aggressively. They defined aggressively as offering many diverse options to meet the special needs of each juvenile better. For example, the Worcester area showed that 43 percent of the community-based group reappeared in court, compared with 67 percent of the community reformitory group. Ohlin and Miller also noted that the region that deviated least from the traditional approach had "an exceptionally large increase in recidivism."

Preliminary results from the NCCD Massachusetts study concluded that there was a large drop in the incidence of "recidivism" by juveniles in the new programs, including a large drop in the severity of offenses. The decrease in severity was noted for more violent offenders. The decrease in recidivism was sustained throughout the four-year follow-up period. NCCD said [8, p. 22-29].

Utah has the most encouraging evaluation results. A 1985 study by the Utah Division of Youth Corrections found that 73 percent of youth completing the community programs remained conviction free 12 months after their release. Juveniles paroled from secure facilities had a high conviction rate, but their crimes tended to be less serious than those for which they were originally convicted. Seventy-six percent were convicted of further crimes, but this group had averaged 24 convictions prior to their commitment to a secure facility. [5, p. 6]

NCCD conducted a three-year evaluation of Utah's reforms using a sophisticated research design that measured both frequency and severity of offenses before and after entering the state juvenile justice system. The researchers compared juveniles from community correction programs who had histories of serious and repetitive crimes with juveniles on probation who had committed only minor offenses.

NCCD found that although a large proportion of the juveniles in community-based services continued to be arrested, there were large declines in their rate of offenses. A "suppression effect" was calculated for both groups, which attempted to quantify reductions in the frequency of delinquent behavior. The higher the suppression ratio, the lower the recidivism. Yths in community-based services scored 66 percent for number of arrests and 72 percent for seriousness of offenses. The probation group registered less impressive reductions of 33 and 44 percent each.